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Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nix v. Whiteside,' the Supreme Court upheld a defense attor-
ney's right to refuse to assist his client in presenting testimony
which counsel believes is false. 2 The Court held that counsel's re-
fusal to participate in the perjury did not stifle the criminal defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.3 In
so holding the Court relied upon the two-pronged standard of
Strickland v. Washington4 to determine the realm of conduct permit-
ted under the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel.5 The Court held that counsel's actions in the present case
conformed to the ethical standards set by the "recognized canons of
ethics, the standards established by the State in statutes or profes-
sional codes, and the sixth amendment."' 6 Additionally, the Court
noted that counsel's actions were insufficient to establish the preju-
dice required to constitute a prima facie case of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. 7 The Court also firmly denied the defendant's
1 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
2 Id. at 989.
3 Id. at 993-99. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)(setting clear two-
pronged test for determining whether defendant was accorded effective assistance of
counsel); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
5 Note, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's Dual Burden in Claims of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 755, 762-64 (1984). The dual burden consists of
(I) proving counsel acted "unreasonably" under "the prevailing norms of the profes-
sion;" and (2) proving "counsel's incompetent assistance prejudiced the defense by ren-
dering the proceeding fundamentally unfair." Id.
6 106 S. Ct. at 994. Essentially the Court decided the sixth amendment issue, but
avoided deciding specific standards of professional conduct. The Court left those issues
to the states to decide. Id.
7 106 S. Ct. at 999.
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contention that the constitutional right to testify includes the right
to testify falsely.8 The Court, using the Strickland standard, reversed
the Eighth Circuit's decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus be-
cause the defendant could maintain neither that counsel acted "un-
reasonably" under the existing norms of the profession nor that the
proceedings were prejudiced as a result of such acts. 9
This Note argues that while the Supreme Court correctly ap-
proved counsel's actions in the present case, it failed to set a stan-
dard against which future cases can be measured. The Court clearly
affirmed that where the client intends to commit perjury,10 counsel
may take certain preventative actions to dissuade the client from
committing the perjury.'1 The courts, however, should not permit
counsel to make threats to breach client confidences or withdraw
representation where counsel suspects the possibility of perjury.
12
Such conduct would effectively destroy the benefits of the present
adversary system. The adversary system attempts to promote jus-
tice and the effective representation of counsel by encouraging cli-
ents to be candid with counsel without the fear of any breaches in
confidence. 13 After all, the judge or jury, not counsel, should de-
cide the truth of a defendant's testimony.
14
II. FACTS
On February 8, 1977, Emanuel Charles Whiteside and two
others went to Calvin Love's apartment in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, look-
ing for marijuana. 15 Love was in bed with his girlfriend when
Whiteside arrived. 16 An argument broke out between Whiteside
and Love over the marijuana. 17 At one point during the argument
Love asked his girlfriend to get his "piece."' 8 Later, Love got out of
8 Id. at 998.
9 Id. at 999.
10 It will be argued that obvious perjury should be limited to those circumstances
where the client admits his intended perjury to counsel.
11 Such preventative actions consist of (1) informing clients of the penalties for per-
jury; (2) threatening to withdraw as counsel; and (3) continuing as counsel, but threaten-
ing to reveal the client's perjury to the court.
12 See Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hard-
est Questions, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1469, 1476-78 (1966). Freedman argues that if counsel is
allowed to withdraw, the client will simply go to another attorney and withhold the in-
criminating evidence from the new attorney. Id.
13 Id. at 1470.
14 Id.





bed, but returned without physical confrontation with Whiteside. 19
According to Whiteside's testimony, Love then started to reach
under his pillow and advanced toward Whiteside.20 At this point,
Whiteside stabbed Love in the chest causing his death.
2 1
The police charged Whiteside with murder.2 2 Whiteside re-
quested appointed counsel. 23 He rejected his first appointed coun-
sel, saying that he was uncomfortable dealing with an attorney who
was a former prosecutor. 24 The court then appointed Gary L.
Robinson who shortly thereafter began his investigation. 25 White-
side told Robinson that he stabbed Love as Love "was pulling a pis-
tol from underneath the pillow on the bed."'26 Upon further
questioning by Robinson, however, Whiteside admitted that he had
not actually seen a gun, but that he was sure Love possessed one.2 7
The police found no gun on the premises of Love's apartment and
neither of Whiteside's two companions admitted to seeing a gun
during the incident.28 After hearing this information, Robinson
counseled Whiteside that he needed to establish only a reasonable
belief that a gun existed to prove a claim of self-defense.2 9
Whiteside consistently told Robinson that he had never actually
seen a gun in Love's hand.30 About one week before trial, however,
during preparation for testimony, Whiteside told Robinson and his
associate, Donna Paulsen, that he remembered seeing something
"metallic" in Love's hand.3 l Robinson asked Whiteside about the
"metallic" object and Whiteside responded that "in Howard Cook's
case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead."3 2 Robin-










28 Id. It should be noted that shortly after the police search of Love's apartment, the
victim's family removed all of Love's personal effects from the apartment. Id.
29 Id. It seems clear that counsel accurately conveyed the requirements for establish-
ing a claim of self-defense and that Whiteside knew that the existence of a gun was not
necessary, though it may be presumed he knew it would be helpful.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Howard Cook apparently was someone whom Whiteside knew who was con-
victed of murder. The Court made no attempt to explain the specific circumstances of
Howard Cook's case. It may be inferred that Whiteside thought Howard Cook was con-
victed primarily because he did not lie about seeing a gun.
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committing perjury.33 Whiteside insisted he would still testify to
that effect at trial.3 4 Robinson then advised Whiteside that if White-
side committed perjury it would be Robinson's duty as counsel to
tell the court and attempt to impeach that particular testimony.35
Robinson also indicated that he might attempt to withdraw his rep-
resentation if Whiteside insisted on committing perjury.
36
At trial Whiteside testified that he acted in self-defense. He
stated that he "knew" Love had a gun and that he was under the
impression Love was reaching for a gun when he fatally stabbed
Love.37 On cross examination, however, Whiteside admitted that he
never actually saw a gun in the victim's hand.38 Robinson devel-
oped testimony of other witnesses and presented evidence on
Whiteside's behalf that Love had been seen on prior occasions with
a sawed-off shotgun, that the police search of Love's apartment was
careless, and that Love's family removed everything after the police
search.3 9 Robinson presented this evidence in an attempt to prove a
basis for Whiteside's fear that Love had a gun.40
The jury returned a guilty verdict of second-degree murder.
41
Whiteside then moved for a new trial, claiming Robinson's warnings
not to testify that he saw a gun or "something metallic" deprived
him of his right to a fair trial. 42 After a hearing, the trial court de-
nied Whiteside's motion and made specific findings of facts consis-
tent with Robinson's testimony.4
3
Whiteside appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme
Court of Iowa.44 The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed Whiteside's
conviction, holding that Whiteside had no right to have counsel
present perjured testimony and that counsel had no duty to assist a
client in committing perjury.45 In addition, the court lauded both
33 Id. at 992.
34 Id.
35 Id. It should be noted that counsel's motivation in the present case may have
stemmed from his belief that his client's testimony would ruin his case. Clearly, the
prosecution could impeach the client's perjurious testimony and thereby discredit even
the client's truthful testimony.
36 Id. Whiteside testified that he feared that if he "didn't go along with-with what was
happening, that it was no gun being involved, maybe that he will pull out of my trial."
106 S. Ct. at 992 n.2 (citing Appeal to Petition for cert. at A-70).








45 Id. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (1978). The Iowa court relied on the IowA
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Robinson and Paulsen for their ethical behavior, noting that both
attorneys acted as required under Iowa law.
46
Having exhausted his appeals in the Iowa courts, Whiteside
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Iowa.47 The district court
denied the petition on the grounds that there could be no habeas
relief since no constitutional right exists to present a perjured
defense.
48
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the district court and granted the writ of habeas corpus. 49
Accepting both the factual findings of the trial court and the ruling
that a criminal defendant has no right to commit perjury, the court,
nevertheless, held that Robinson violated Whiteside's right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.50 The court reasoned that a defendant's
communication of an intent to commit perjury to counsel does not
destroy his right to effective assistance of counsel.51 Therefore, the
court found that Robinson's warning to Whiteside that he would re-
veal the perjurious testimony to the court was "a threat to violate
the attorney's duty to preserve client confidences. ' 52 The court
held that Robinson's threatened violation of a client confidence con-
stituted "unreasonable" conduct under the standards laid down in
Strickland v. Washington.53 The court also held that the conflict be-
tween Robinson's ethical duties and his duty of loyalty to his client
met Strickland's prejudice standard.54
The Supreme Court granted Whiteside's petition for certio-
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1985) and IOWA CODE § 721.2
(1975) (now IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1985)). DR 7-102(A)(4) expressly forbids the use of
perjured testimony by attorneys. IOWA CODE § 720.3 criminalizes the subornation of
perjury. Id.
46 106 S. Ct. at 992.
47 Id.
48 Id. The district court also accepted the state trial court's factual finding that
Whiteside's testimony as to the existence of a gun would have been perjurious.
49 Id. See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).
50 106 S. Ct. at 993. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant's privilege to testify in his defense did not include the
right to commit perjury. Id.
51 106 S. Ct. at 993.
52 Id. It should be noted that although Whiteside presented "his claim before the
Supreme Court of Iowa as a denial of his due process right to a fair trial, and not as a
denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals accepted the Dis-
trict Court's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment claim was exhausted." Id.
53 Id. The Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 684-87, held that a defend-
ant must prove that (1) the conduct of counsel was "unreasonable" given the accepted
standards of professional ethics and (2) that counsel's conduct prejudiced the outcome
of the case.
54 106 S. Ct. at 993. The court further denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Id.
696 [Vol. 77
1986]ATTORNEY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN PERJURY 697
rari55 to determine "whether the Sixth Amendment right of a crimi-
nal defendant to assistance of counsel is violated when an attorney
refuses to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testi-
mony at his trial."
'56
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In Nix v. Whiteside, the Supreme Court57 held that the conduct of
an attorney who succesfully dissuades his client from committing
perjury by threatening to withdraw from representation and disclose
the perjury falls within the range of reasonable professional conduct
as set down in Strickland v. Washington.58 The Court held Robinson's
conduct reasonable and beneficial to his client in light of the una-
nimity of the sources of standards for professional conduct which
dearly prohibit an attorney from aiding in his client's perjury.59
Further, the Court held that the scope of the constitutional
right to testify does not include the right to testify falsely.60 The
55 471 U.S. 1014 (1985).
56 106 S. Ct. at 993.
57 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, Powell,
Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Black-
mun filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Jus-
tice Stevens also filed a separate concurring opinion.
58 106 S. Ct. at 997.
59 Id. The Court determined that Robinson only dissuaded his client from testifying
falsely and that he aided Whiteside in establishing the basis for Whiteside's fear that
Love possessed a gun. Id. According to the Court, an attorney has always had the duty
to prevent a client's intended commission of a crime and that a client's admission of his
intention to commit a crime is not within the confidences which an attorney must re-
spect. Id. at 995. In essence the Court reasoned that dissuasion from the commission
of a crime is beneficial to the client. Id. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7), DR 7-102(B)(1), DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.2(d), 3.3(a)(4) (1983). See also MacCarthy & Mejia, The Perjuri-
ous Client Question: Putting Criminal Defense Lawyers Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1197, 1200-08 (1984).
60 106 S. Ct. at 998. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225, held that prior contrary
statements inadmissable under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could be used
to impeach a defendant's testimony. The Court cited Harris and United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980), for the proposition that no constitutional right
exists to testify falsely. 106 S. Ct. at 998. Apparently, the right to testify in one's own
defense "is of relatively recent origin." The courts previously reasoned that defendants
should not be allowed to testify as a result of their obvious bias in the case. Id. at 993.
See also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1960); State v. Laffer, 38 Iowa 422
(1874)(upholding Iowa's disqualification of criminal defendant testimony); R. MORRIS,
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 59-60 (2d ed. 1959).
This trend was reversed by the close of the nineteenth century as most states and
the federal courts abolished the rule by statute. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30-
3 1; see also 106 S. Ct. at 993; Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History in Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1895). Despite the fact the Court has never held that criminal defendants
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Court also held that counsel's duty of confidentiality "does not ex-
tend to a client's announced plans to engage in future criminal
conduct."
6 1
Additionally, the Court held that Whiteside did not establish
the prejudice required by the second prong of the Strickland stan-
dard.62 The Court reasoned that since Whiteside's testimony would
have been false the failure to submit the false testimony to the jury
did not prejudice the outcome of the trial.63 The Court determined
that Robinson's conduct was consistent with the standards laid
down in Strickland and did not deprive Whiteside of his constitu-
tional rights to testify in his own behalf and to assistance of
counsel.
64
The Court reiterated that the Strickland standard encompassed
the correct measure for all claims of habeas corpus relief based
upon the deprivation of assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
sixth amendment.65 The Court acknowledged that the defendant
must prove that (1) counsel made such grievous error that counsel
effectively was not serving as "counsel" as contemplated in the sixth
amendment, and that (2) the error prejudiced the outcome of the
trial such that it was unfair. 66 Additionally, the Court held that
courts must possess a strong presumption that counsel's perform-
ance falls inside the area of reasonable professional conduct.
67
The Court held that the power rests with the states to set rea-
sonable standards of attorney conduct. 68 All other codes of profes-
have a due process right to testify, the several circuits have so held, and the right has
long been assumed. See 106 S. Ct. at 993. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
931 (1983). The Court has also suggested that the right to testify "exists as a corrollary
to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled testimony." 106 S. Ct. at 993. See
also Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 598-601 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 601-03 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
61 106 S. Ct. at 993. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). The Court
cited counsel's duty as an officer of the court and the goal of searching for truth as
substance for its ruling. 106 S. Ct. at 993.
62 106 S. Ct. at 999. The Court found that "to show prejudice, it must be established
that the claimed lapses in counsel's performance rendered the trial unfair so as to under-
mine confidence in the outcome' of the trial." Id. at 994; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
63 106 S. Ct. at 994.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 993.
66 Id. at 993-94.
67 Id. at 994. In order to react to the tendency to blame the unsuccessful defense, the
courts should "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." 106 S. Ct. at 994 (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689).
68 Id. Specifically, the Court held that
a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under
698 [Vol. 77
1986]ATTORNEY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN PERJURY 699
sional standards may be used only as guides. 69 Furthermore, the
Court refused to consider the weight to be assigned to the recog-
nized canons of ethics, the state codes of ethics, and the sixth
amendment in defining the parameters of attorney conduct.70 The
Court reasoned that such a determination was unnecessary in the
present case, since all of the sources point to the same conclusion:
that counsel may not assist in his client's perjury.71
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's determination that in
the event of suspected perjury, counsel should allow the client to
take the stand but force the client to relate his testimony in his own
"free narrative" without assistance from counsel.72 The Court rea-
soned that standards outlined in the various codes rejected the pas-
sive participation involved in the "free narrative" approach. 73
Consequently, applying the Strickland standard to Nix, the Court
found that Robinson's refusal to participate in his client's perjury,
his threat to withdraw as counsel and his threats to reveal the per-
the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of
professional conduct and thereby intrude into the State's proper authority to define
and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to




71 Id. The Court outlined the history of professional ethics standards which prohibit
an attorney from aiding his client in perjury. The more recent sources cited included
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980) which provides:
"(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not... (4) knowingly use perjured
testimony of false evidence... (7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
The State of Iowa adopted DR 7-102 which now governs all lawyers who practice in
Iowa courts. See IowA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1985); MODEL RULEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983). The Court also noted that DR 4-I01(C)(3) of
the Model Code and Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules grant a specific exemption from the
attorney-client privilege that allows attorney disclosure of a client's actual or intended
perjury. 106 S. Ct. at 995. See MODEL RULE 3.3(a)(4); MODEL CODE DR 7-102(B)(1);
Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Association v. Crary,
245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976)(requiring counsel disclosure of client perjury).
Additionally the Court cites Iowa law which makes it illegal for an attorney to ex-
amine a witness when counsel can anticipate perjurious responses. 106 S. Ct. at 996;
IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1985).
72 106 S. Ct. at 996. The Eighth Circuit in this case and the Ninth Circuit have ap-
proved this "free narrative" approach. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1331 (8th
Cir. 1984); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). The rationale behind this
approach was to prevent raising the probability of a mistrial by withdrawal of counsel
while still indicating to the judge the highly dubious nature of the client's testimony.
Most other jurisdictions have rejected this approach. See United States v. Curtis, 742
F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967),
aff'd after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968); Dodd v. Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17, 19
(Fla. 1968).
73 106 S. Ct. at 996.
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jury to the court were the required actions according to all applica-
ble canons of ethics. 74 The Court held that since Whiteside did not
carry his burden of proving the unreasonableness of Robinson's ac-
tions, Whiteside's sixth amendment rights were not violated.75 Fur-
thermore, the Court refuted Whiteside's argument that he sustained
prejudice since his attorney represented conflicting interests. 76
Whiteside alleged the conflicting interests were counsel's duty to
maintain client confidences and counsel's duty not to aid in the
presentation of perjurious testimony." The Court held that the
conflict in the present case was imposed on counsel by Whiteside's
proposed perjury, and as a result was not the same as counsel creat-
ing the conflict.78
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, emphasized that the
Court has no authority to establish the ethical standards for attor-
neys practicing in state courts.7 9 In addition, he noted that the
Court has no jurisdiction over legal ethics.8 0 Justice Brennan read
the majority's decision as concluding that the Court may regulate
the conduct of state court proceedings only when federal rights are
violated.8 1 Justice Brennan further pointed out that the issue of
74 Id. at 997. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a)(1), Rule 1.6,
Comment (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-110(B),(C)
(1980)(all cited for allowing counsel withdrawal as a proper response to intended client
perjury). The Court noted, however, that withdrawal may result in problems of mistrial
and double jeopardy. 106 S. Ct. at 996. The "free narrative" approach has been sug-
gested in cases where withdrawal is not possible. Id. Most jurisdictions and the Model
Rules have rejected this approach, prohibiting any participation by counsel in allowing
the alleged perjury. Id.
75 106 S. Ct. at 996.
76 Id. at 999. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (in alleging conflict of inter-
est in case of multiple representation defendant must prove counsel's conflict of interest
made representation ineffective).
77 106 S. Ct. at 999.
78 Id. The Court went further to point out that allowing a conflict between a client's
proposed perjury and counsel's ethical considerations "to give rise to a presumption
that counsel's assistance was prejudically ineffective" would call into question every
criminal conviction where the defendant had sought to achieve acquittal through illegal
means. Id.
79 Id. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
81 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). The language Justice Brennan relied on is:
When examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide
range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to con-
stitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into
the State's proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional con-
duct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.
Id. at 994.
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proper ethical conduct in cases of intended perjury was not an issue
in the present case.82 Accordingly, he noted that "the Court's essay
regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client's
suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without
force of law."
'83
C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Ste-
vens, concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the majority's
use of a federal habeas corpus case to determine how counsel
should treat a client's intended perjury.84 Accordingly, Justice
Blackmun argued that the only question in Nix was "whether the
lawyer's actions deprived the defendant of a fair trial which the Sixth
Amendment is meant to guarantee. '"85 Justice Blackmun found that
the defendant failed to show the prejudice necessary for federal
habeas relief.8 6
Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for approaching this case
as if the Strickland standard always required the determination of the
perimeters of reasonable professional conduct.8 7 Strickland ex-
pressly dictates that the prejudice requirement should be decided
ahead of the performance standard where it is convenient.8 8 Justice
Blackmun suggested that the only question the Court needed to
consider was "whether its confidence in the outcome of Whiteside's
trial is in any way undermined by the knowledge that he refrained
from presenting false testimony."8 9
Citing a long line of cases, Justice Blackmun implied that the
absence of perjured testimony at trial may never be questioned as
part of the fairness of a trial.90 He reiterated the majority's stand
that the privilege to testify in one's own defense does not extend to
perjury.9 1 Thus, since Whiteside received a fair trial and none of
82 Id. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
84 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
86 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). See 466 U.S. at 697.
89 106 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)
(asserting that use of perjured evidence by the prosecution has continually been deemed
unfair where use of such evidence resulted in a conviction). The converse ofAgurs is that
the absence of such perjured evidence cannot be deemed unfair.
91 106 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun,J., concurring)(citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
at 225). At this pointJustice Blackmun questioned the implicit assertion that the right of
a defendant to testify in his own trial is not a settled issue. Justice Blackmun found that
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the constitutional protections guaranteeing a fair trial were
breached, no prejudice could be found.
92
Justice Blackmun joined the majority in attacking the defend-
ant's contention that a conflict of interest existed between his coun-
sel's ethical obligations and counsel's duty of loyalty to his client.
93
Justice Blackmun stated that the defendant had no legitimate inter-
est that conflicted with counsel's ethical obligation. 94 Thus, unless a
conflict denied a defendant's federally protected constitutional right
to counsel, no prejudice existed. 95
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun suggested that counsel's ethical
obligation not to present perjured testimony is entirely consistent
with the defendant's best interest. 96 In fact, had Whiteside lied, not
only would he have risked being convicted of perjury, but the prose-
cution could have impeached his testimony. 97 Additionally, the
judge could have taken such impeachment into his consideration of
Whiteside's sentence. 98 Justice Blackmun also suggested that the
jury could have convicted Whiteside of first-degree murder if they
believed he lied about the absence of premeditation. 99
In the absence of prejudice, Justice Blackmun noted that no
reason existed to judge counsel's conduct.' 00 Justice Blackmun con-
tinued, however, to list several factors which would have a bearing
on whether a client's sixth amendment rights were violated in the
event counsel suspects his client intends to commit perjury. 10'
any state statute abrogating such a right would violate both the sixth and fourteenth
amendments and perhaps the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 1004-05
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)(cited for
the proposition that defendants have fundamental authority to make certain decisions,
such as whether to testify at trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972)(invali-
dating a Tennessee law requiring a defendant to testify first for defense or not at all, on
grounds that the law violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination).
92 106 S. Ct. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
93 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Blackmun held the line of cases the defend-
ant relied on inapposite because, unlike the present case, the conflicts involved serious
violations of constitutional rights. Id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra notes
71 and 76. See also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-71 (1981)(counsel paid by em-
ployer may have followed employer's interest instead of defendant's interest); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75 (1942)(counsel representing two defendants at-
tempted to minimize one codefendant's guilt by failing to object to certain testimony).
95 106 S. Ct. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
96 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
97 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
98 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
99 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 1006. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). Three factors Justice Blackmun mentioned are: (1)
the degree of certainty with which counsel feels the testimony is false; (2) the stage at
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Justice Blackmun warned attorneys not to act as judge and jury
in determining the facts. 10 2 He counseled that attorneys judging
their own clients "pose[s] a danger of depriving their clients of the
zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment."'
03
Justice Blackmun also expressed concern about "the Court's im-
plicit adoption of a set of standards of professional responsibility for
attorneys in state criminal proceedings."' 1 4 The states, not the
Supreme Court, should decide how attorneys should conduct them-
selves in staie courts. 10 5 Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that de-
termining first whether a defendant has carried the burden of
proving prejudice before delving into counsel's performance
"avoids unnecessary federal interference in a State's regulation of
its bar."'
10 6
D. JUSTICE STEVEN'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Stevens, also concurring in the judgment, found that de-
spite the apparent clarity with which counsel in the present case saw
the client's intended perjury, a danger still existed in making such
pretrial judgments. 0 7 He warned that after reflection even "the
most honest witness may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) de-
tails that he previously overlooked."'' 0 8 Justice Stevens suggested
that in cases of suspected client perjury, resolving the "areas of un-
certainty" that exist with respect to acceptable attorney conduct will
be "colored by the the particular circumstances attending the actual
event and its aftermath."'
0 9
V. ANALYSIS
In Nix v. Whiteside, though the Supreme Court demonstrated its
which counsel discovers the perjury; and (3) the means by which counsel may deter the
client from committing the perjury. Justice Blackmun noted further that these factors
are likely to vary with each case. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting United States ex reL Wilcox v.Johnson, 555
F.2d 115, 122 (3rd Cir. 1977)(where counsel's threat to withdraw in middle of trial
caused defendant not to take stand at all, the court found defendant's right to testify
violated)).
103 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asserted that the American Bar
Association's amicus curiae brief in support of the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct should have been addressed to the states rather than the Supreme Court. Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
106 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 1007. (Stevens, J., concurring).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
109 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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desire to reduce the probability of success "in claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel," it once again refused to establish standards
to guide attorneys in cases of suspected client perjury.110 When es-
tablishing such standards, the Court certainly needs to take note of
the dangers of allowing counsel too much freedom in reacting to
impending perjury by a client.11' Ultimately it is for the judge or
jury to decide the truth-not defense counsel. Justice will be better
served through establishing a standard which allows counsel in
cases of obvious perjury' 12 to inform the judge orjury while reserv-
ing less obvious cases of perjury for adjudication in the normal
course of trial. 1 3 In cases that involve situations constituting mere
factual discrepancies without a client admission of intent to commit
perjury, counsel should be required to pursue the case as if counsel
believes the client's testimony. 1 4 The health of the adversary sys-
110 Note, supra note 5, at 755 (discussing Strickland).
111 106 S. Ct. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112 The only situations of obvious perjury are those where the client admits his inten-
tion to commit perjury. The facts of Nix v. Whiteside fit this characterization of perjury.
No other factual possibilities should be considered obvious since that would force an
attorney to judge his client. Allowing withdrawal or the breach of client confidences at
trial in cases where the client admits he will commit perjury does not force counsel to
make a judgment.
This standard will minimize the adverse effects on the adversary system and be eas-
ily applicable by practicing attorneys.
113 Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues, 70
MINN. L. REv. 121, 122 (1985). Rieger stresses that Nix v. Whiteside is not a proper "vehi-
cle" to decide the issue of attorney conduct in cases of client perjury. Rieger also cited a
number of articles treating the topic of client perjury. See, e.g., Brazil, Unanticipated Client
Perjury and the Collision of the Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REV.
601 (1979); Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsi-
bility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1493 (1966); Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution
to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to his Client, 59 DEN. LJ.
75 (1981); Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, LITIGATION, Winter 1975; Freed-
man, supra note 12; Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the
Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HorsTRA L. REV. 665 (1978); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy
and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Robinson, The Perjury Di-
lemma in an Adversary System, 82 DICK. L. REV. 545 (1978); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977).
See also Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclo-
sure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); MacCarthy
& Mejia, supra note 59, at 1197.
114 This places the full burden of determining the truth of the client's testimony on
the judge or jury. Placing the burden on the judge or jury eliminates all ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and guarantees the client his proper constitutional guaran-
tees to testify in his own behalf, right to counsel, and right to a fair trial.
It is important to give the client the benefit of the doubt as to his or her own testi-
mony. The criminal justice system in this country ascribes to the maxim that defendants
shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
See also Freedman, supra note 12, at 1469, where Freedman argues that to preserve
the adversary system given the presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, the attor-
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tern depends upon the avid assistance given to defendants by coun-
sel.115 Creating uncertainty in the minds of defense counsel, by
requiring them to speculate as to the veracity of their client's testi-
mony, will decrease the efficiency of the entire judicial system and
weaken the protection of the sixth amendment.
Although the Court refused to set specific standards for attor-
ney conduct, the Court did observe that defendants have no sixth
amendment right to commit perjury. 1 6 The Court, however,
should have gone further to protect the integrity of the adversary
system through limiting its holding to the facts of the present case.
Counsel's actions should be limited to factual situations where cli-
ents admit to counsel an intent to commit perjury.
117
Instead, the Court suggested that state ethical codes, or per-
haps the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, will serve as the standard for determining reasonable con-
duct. 118 These codes, however, provide no guidance to counsel in
situations where counsel believes the client intends to commit per-
jury.1 9 Additionally, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
makes no mention of how an attorney should deal with cases where
ney-client privilege and the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is
proper for defense counsel to place a witness on the stand despite counsel's fear of
perjury and to give a client legal advice which may tempt him or her to commit perjury.
115 Id. at 1476-78.
116 106 S. Ct. at 997.
117 Critics may point out that forcing attorneys to assist in presenting potentially per-
jured testimony seems inconsistent with the lack of a constitutional right to testify falsely
and with the American Bar Association's Model Rules. It is agreed that inconsistency
exists between the proposed standard and the absence of a right to testify falsely, but the
nature of the problem precludes any other alternative. The inconsistency with the
Model Rules will be dealt with later in this Note.
118 Id. at 994. The Court is correct in reserving to the states the authority to enact the
rules to govern the practice of law in state courts.
119 Rieger, supra note 113, at 124. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.3(C) only prohibits counsel from offering false evidence "knowingly".or evidence he
"reasonably believes" is false. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(A)(4)
and 3.3(B) also order counsel to take "reasonable remedial measures" even if evidence
is privileged. Thus, the Model Rules appear to eliminate the gap between perjury and
the client confidence rules of the Model Code.
The Model Rules perpetuate the uncertainty about acceptable attorney conduct as
there is a dispute in the official comment as to what means of persuasion may be used on
a client and also as to what course of action should be taken in the event the client
refuses to cooperate.
Many cases have been decided prohibiting withdrawal of counsel immediately
before or during trial. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1978); State
v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 234, 468 P.2d 136, 139 (1970); Maddox v. State, 613
S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). But see State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189,
191-96, 368 N.E.2d 1278, 1281-82 (1977)(holding denial of attorney's motion to with-
draw as error).
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counsel is not absolutely sure the client will commit perjury.120
The three approaches to proper attorney conduct in cases of
suspected client perjury that will be discussed in this Note are Jus-
tice Blackmun's approach in his concurring opinion; Carol T. Rie-
ger's "beyond a reasonable doubt" approach; and the "free
narrative" approach. Though courts and scholars have attempted
to devise alternatives to solve the problem of client perjury, most
approaches have failed to set a feasible standard for counsel to
judge a client's testimony.
First, Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, suggested
three factors which the courts and attorneys in general might con-
sider in determining how to proceed: "how certain the attorney is
that the proposed testimony is false, the stage of the proceeding at
which the attorney discovers the plan, and the ways in which the
attorney may be able to dissuade his client." 12' Justice Blackmun
elaborated on these factors only by stating that these factors will
vary enough from case to case to render "inappropriate a blanket
rule that defense attorneys must reveal, or threaten to reveal, a cli-
ent's anticipated perjury to the court."'
122
Justice Blackmun's first standard requires counsel to judge his
client in cases where no clear evidence of intended perjury exists.
In applying standards requiring such a value judgment by counsel,
there exists a difficulty in determining the appropriate degree of
certainty necessary to allow counsel to reveal his or her doubts to
the court. 123
Justice Blackmun's second factor relates only to the potential
conduct to be chosen by counsel after he learns of the perjury.
Counsel cannot withdraw upon discovery of perjury during or right
before trial since such action might prejudice the client.
120 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(4) states that an at-
torney may not "knowingly use perjured tesimony." The Model Code makes no attempt
to define what scope or standards should be applied to the term "knowingly."
See also Callan & David, supra note 113, at 394, where the authors argue that the
application of the many ethical standards requires the disclosure of client misconduct
only in limited situations. Callan and David point out, however, that there is a need to
remove the ambiguity from the principles dealing with disclosure of client misconduct.
Id. The authors make specific suggestions for changes which will provide clear stan-
dards to guide attorney conduct. Id. They argue that preservation of the adversary sys-
tem is important because without it counsel would not be privy to the client's admissions
in the first place. Id. at 395.
121 106 S. Ct. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122 Id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123 Counsel's judgment of a client reflects only the facts in counsel's possession. In
fact counsel may not have the full set of facts in his possession. It is the purpose of a
trial to ascertain all the facts and have the judge or jury render a decision.
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As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion, a
mere change in testimony by a client before or during trial may re-
flect an honest recollection of the facts. 124 As time passes, witnesses
recall some things and forget others. To submit all defendants to
potential persecution by counsel for changes in testimony is unfair.
Justice Blackmun's third factor revives the original problem of
deciding what constitutes permissible conduct in persuading a client
not to commit perjury. Counsel obviously must be careful not to
discourage accurate testimony by the client.
Consequently, in cases of suspected client perjury, counsel
should be allowed only to inform the client of the penalties for per-
jury and the potential effect of the perjury on the case. In situations
of less than obvious perjury, allowing any greater action by counsel
will potentially suppress valuable testimony.
125
A second approach suggested by Carol T. Rieger advocates the
use of a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for determining the
veracity of a client's testimony. 126 Under this standard counsel can
request an in camera hearing if counsel is convinced "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" that the client did or will commit perjury.
127
Unfortunately, applying this standard forces counsel to make
value judgments on less than perfect information. In addition the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is the same standard the jury
will use in the real trial so, the jury could apply that standard rather
than have counsel presort the testimony before trial. 128 Certainly,
the suggested in camera proceeding would tend to protect the cli-
124 106 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125 Counsel should not put pressure on the client through threats to withdraw or re-
veal the perjury at trial unless the client admits he intends to commit perjury. Threats
are as good as judgment when testimony is suppressed.
126 Rieger, supra note 113, at 149-51. The author explains that this standard should
be used in view of the fact that juries are supposed to apply this standard in judging
criminal defendants. Id. at 149. Allegedly, if defense counsel in view of the evidence
finds "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the client will or did commit perjury, then coun-
sel should request a continuance in the trial. Id. at 150. Rieger suggests that counsel
and client who disagree as to the truth of the client's testimony should appear before a
non-presiding judge for an in camera hearing to determine the truth. Id. Rieger says
this separate in camera proceeding will give the client added protection from incorrect
judgments by counsel. Id. at 152.
127 Id.
128 Another related problem with Rieger's approach is that the approach requires the
non-presiding judge to determine whether the client intends to commit perjury. In or-
der to make this determination, however, other evidence would have to be introduced,
such as the evidence to be introduced at trial. Consequently, the defendant should have
counsel to insure the fairness of the proceeding. Also, because this evidence will be
introduced at trial, justice will be expedited if the judge and jury are allowed to deter-
mine the truth of the client's testimony at trial.
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ent, but at the expense of using the already scarce resources of the
legal system. Additionally, Rieger suggests that at such a proceed-
ing the defendant would have no right to counsel.1 29 Depriving the
defendant of counsel at any point during his trial would seem to
violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
Rieger further suggested that the defendant would have a right
to present his testimony at trial, without assistance of counsel, de-
spite an unfavorable ruling in the in camera proceeding. 130 Such a
procedure would run into the same problems as the "free narrative"
approach. The "free narrative" approach allows defense counsel to
place his client on the stand but refuse to develop the client's testi-
mony through examination where counsel suspects the client in-
tends to commit perjury. Essentially, if counsel suddenly
discontinues examination of his client on the stand the judge orjury
might sense the change and not evaluate the client's testimony in a
fair light.
13'
The "free narrative" approach amounts to a weak compromise.
Allowing an attorney to temporarily withdraw while the client testi-
fies in his own words effectively denies the client the right to coun-
sel. Further, this alternative only exists when the attorney decides
the client will commit perjury. Consequently, the problem of deter-
mining standards to guide attorney conduct in such cases still exists.
The preceding three approaches, as well as the Court's decision
in Nix, leave important questions unanswered: (1) should counsel
ever judge the client and, if so, how?; and (2) what actions should
counsel take when evidence of perjury is not clear? In spite of the
narrow stance the Court has taken in construing ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims, attorneys should be careful not to mistakenly
dissuade a client from testifying. Situations abound where a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to testify would be violated by the con-
duct of counsel as approved in this case.' 32
129 See Rieger, supra note 113, at 159-60. Essentially the author's premise is wrong
because in fact the in camera proceeding is adversarial in nature. The client is pitted
against his attorney and, regardless of the presence of the prosecutor, still deserves rep-
resentation. The author reasons that this process could be endless if the client were
entitled to new counsel as the next counsel may for the same reason as the first counsel
feel his client will commit perjury in the in camera proceeding. This problem no doubt
might suggest a good reason to forgoe counsel during the in camera proceeding. This
would, however, probably run afoul of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
130 Id. at 160-62.
131 106 S. Ct. at 996.
132 Rieger, supra note 113, at 121 (pointing out that this was not the proper case to
deal with the issue of client perjury). It is probable that the Court also felt this way
because it refused to set any standards for future cases.
For example, if counsel threatened to withdraw or reveal alleged perjury to the
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The courts should determine the truth or falsity of statements
made by defendants. The interests of the adversary system are
served best by limiting counsel's actions in cases involving alleged
client perjury.1 33 While defendants have no sixth amendment right
to commit perjury, attorneys have the duty to present the client's
view of the case at trial. If client testimony is false, it will presuma-
bly be impeached.
The courts should trust the ability of the prosecution to im-
peach perjured testimony and the ability of the jury to render a just
verdict. The bias of the system guarantees that innocent people are
not wrongly convicted even if it means that a few guilty people are
set free.134 The present decision shifts that bias in a way which may
see innocent defendants constrained by counsel who have the power
to judge their guilt.
The system guarantees all defendants the right to a fair trial and
the right to counsel.13 5 The system also gives defendants the right
not to testify against themselves.' 36 The system does not require
counsel to reveal a client's confession of guilt at trial even when the
court in every case where a defendant changed his mind, truthful testimony might be
suppressed. As Justice Stevens noted in his concurring opinion, even honest witnesses
change their minds concerning testimony as events fade into the past. 106 S. Ct. at 1007
(Stevens, J., concurring). In these situations a defendant might decide not to testify to
make the best of the situation. Certainly, disagreeable counsel might hurt the defend-
ant's case more than if the defendant remained silent as to his recollection of the events.
133 Ideally, defendants should be permitted to testify as they wish and suffer the pen-
alties of perjury later. Counsel should advise them to tell the truth, but not attempt to
make a judgment as to the veracity of the testimony.
134 See Freedman, supra note 12, at 1471. Essentially all these rights are given to de-
fendants to preserve the adversary system and to give all defendants a fair trial. A rule
permitting counsel's disclosure of client perjury effectively works against all the constitu-
tional and procedural guarantees of the system. Consequently, such a rule would ap-
pear to be against the wishes of the drafters of our constitutional system.
A rule should be sought which infringes only marginally on these constitutional
rights. The adversary system only functions efficiently when both sides do their best
within the rules of the game. If a person is acquitted through the use of perjured testi-
mony, perhaps the blame should be placed on the prosecution for not impeaching the
testimony.
Enforcing a rule of disclosure essentially forces counsel to be both an advocate and
a spy. Freedman points out that no one complains when a person is acquitted because
of an illegal search even though the person's guilt was evident. The situation of client
perjury would not seem to be much different. In order to preserve the benefits of the
entire system society must put up with some minimal abuses.
135 The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and to have Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The fourteenth amendment states
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law...." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
136 The fifth amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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guilty defendant is acquitted. Consequently, the question should be
asked: Why should an attorney ever have to judge the truth of his
client's testimony, especially when counsel is not allowed to reveal a
client's guilt in the event the client never takes the stand?
In situations where the attorney suspects a perjury attempt dur-
ing or before trial, counsel should be allowed great flexibility to per-
suade his client not to commit perjury.1 37 But threats of revealing
the crime or withdrawing representation should only be allowed
where the client actually admits his plan to commit perjury.1
38
The obvious perjury standard advocated in this Note effectively
avoids the problems of an attorney-client valuejudgment. The stan-
dard also preserves the confidentiality of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. Confidentiality facilitates the open discourse between
counsel and his client which allows counsel to advise his client with
full knowledge of the facts. If the courts allow attorneys to breach
client confidences or make threats, clients will be less likely to tell
counsel the truth.139 Since the quality of the adversary system de-
pends greatly on the frank disclosure of the facts by a client to coun-
sel, the system would be irretrievably damaged by allowing counsel
too much power to act upon suspected client perjury. 140
In essence, a trade-off exists between increasing the authority
of counsel to take action in the event of suspected client perjury and
the quality of the adversary system. Forcing attorneys to reveal sus-
pected client perjury reduces the trust a client has in his attorney.
The system recognizes the confidentiality of the attorney-client rela-
tionship and provides a fair trial to uncover perjury and to decide
guilt in order to instill this trust. The obvious perjury standard pre-
serves this trust and maximizes the quality and fairness of the adver-
sary system.
141
137 See MacCarthy & Mejia, supra note 59, at 1219.
138 The Model Rules and the Model Code go too far in suggesting that an attorney's
first duty is to reveal client perjury. The main duty of an attorney is to the client. There
can be no doubt that an attorney who wishes to best serve his client will advise his client
not to commit perjury.
139 See Callan & David, supra note 113, at 332. Essentially without the adversary sys-
tem counsel would never learn of the client's intended perjury. Thus, a rule forcing
counsel to disclose confidential communications will effectively do away with the issue of
client perjury in the future, since counsel will not have the information which uncovers
the potential perjury.
Such a result would be detrimental to both counsel and the client. The system pri-
marily depends on the attorney-client relationship. Without such candid interaction be-
tween counsel and clients the system would be overloaded and inefficient. In order for
attorneys to render the best advocacy, they must know the full factual situation. A rule
requiring disclosure must reduce the quality of representation in the system.
140 Freedman, supra note 12, at 1473.
141 Admittedly, no easy solution exists to the problem of client perjury, but attorneys
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Nix v. Whiteside, the Supreme Court held that counsel may
refuse to assist a client in presenting testimony which counsel is con-
vinced is false.1 42 The Court reasoned that a defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not prohibit
counsel from refusing to participate in his perjury. The Court relied
on the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims first outlined by the Court in Strickland v. Washington. The
Court found that not only did counsel act "reasonably" under the
standards set by the canons of professional ethics, but also that the
defendant failed to prove that counsel's refusal to participate in per-
jury prejudiced the fair outcome of the defendant's trial. The Court
concluded that a defendant's constitutional right to testify does not
include the right to testify falsely.
Despite the wisdom of the holding in the present case, the
Court failed to provide any guidance to attorneys in dealing with
client perjury. The Court's failure to clarify the existing applicable
canons of ethics may place defendants in the unfortunate position of
receiving less than full advocacy from counsel. The Court should
establish a standard which will protect the constitutional rights of
the defendant while preserving the effectiveness of the adversary
system. The Court could have embraced a standard which prohibits
disclosure of suspected perjury except in obvious cases where the
intended perjury is admitted to counsel by the client. Such a stan-
should be able to live with an obvious perjury standard. This writer is inclined to favor
prohibiting counsel from disclosing client misconduct even in cases of obvious perjury,
but that would do much to degrade the humanity of attorneys. See Noonan, supra note
113, at 1485. Noonan argues that an attorney not only has a duty to the adversary sys-
tem, but contends the adversary system "does not demand active suppression of the
truth." Id. at 1492. He says the attorney is also a human being and that "the stating of
truth [is] so necessary to the human personality and so demanded by broad social values
that the systematic presentation of falsehood is both personally demeaning and socially
frustrating." Id. Noonan states: "the lawyer must act with regard for the requirements
of the adversary system and with concern for his own standards as a human person, as
well as with regard for the requirements of the society which the system serves." Id.
Consequently, counsel can live with the morality of presenting testimony which
counsel suspects is perjurious based on counsel's own deductions. But when a client
admits his intention to commit perjury counsel can only conclude that he is actively
participating in the perjury. This is manifestly unfair and demeaning to the humanity of
the attorney.
142 The holding in the present case could be limited to a situation where the client
admits the intended perjury to counsel. Though there exists dicta discussing the various
codes and canons of professional ethics, the Court failed to acknowledge any standards
which could be used to guide attorneys in the future.
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dard should achieve fairness and justice without destroying the ad-
versary system itself.
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